

The Impact of Amalgamation on the Fiscal Soundness of Municipalities:

An Experience from Japan

[Draft]

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Abstract

During the period of 1999 to 2007, Japanese central government developed a promotion policy to amalgamate municipalities. This policy is referred to “Municipal Merger in Heisei Era”. The policy encouraged municipal amalgamations, using a fiscal incentive, which gives subsidies to amalgamated municipalities. This amalgamation policy succeeded in reducing the number of municipalities from 3,229 to 1,801 during that period.

This paper studies a fiscal impact of this amalgamation policy on a fiscal soundness of municipalities. In order to achieve this purpose, this paper tests whether there are statistical differences in fiscal soundness between the amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities, using municipal’s fiscal data.

Our results show that a fiscal soundness of non-amalgamated municipalities is statistically better than that of amalgamated municipalities. This result has the following three suggestions. First, although succeeding in the reduction of the number of municipalities, the amalgamation policy did not achieve an improvement of fiscal soundness of municipalities. Second suggestion is that only the municipalities whose fiscal soundness is weak amalgamated. Last, a service provision of municipalities does

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not have scale-economy.

Key words: municipal amalgamation, fiscal soundness, local government, scale economy

JEL: H72, H83

1. Introduction

In Japan, the number of municipalities has decreased sharply from 3,229 in 1999 to 1,727 in 2010. This large reduction were resulted from the policy of “Municipal Merger in Heisei Era” promoted by the national government. Japanese national government argued that amalgamations of municipalities can strengthen their financial bases through realizing scale economies in administrative expenses. This promotion policy of municipal amalgamation started from 1999, and the movement of amalgamations was peaked from 2003 to 2005 and the reduced number of municipalities was 1,391 during this period. This paper examines whether or not there are differences in fiscal situations between the amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities and shows whether or not the municipal amalgamations through the policy of “Municipal Merger in Heisei Era” have positive effects on municipal financial soundness,

A lot of countries have encouraged municipal amalgamations to decrease per capita expenditure and realize scale economies in providing local public services. However, in contrary to the argument of municipal administrations, recent findings are not necessarily favorable the financial merits through municipal amalgamations.

Drew et al. (2012) examined whether there are scale economies in local government outlays by analyzing the expenditure of local governments in Australia and found that when local governments are decomposed into subgroups on the basis of population density, the evidence of scale economies in expenditure disappears. Reiljan et al. (2013) indicated that, in Estonian local governments, the municipal amalgamation does not have an effect on the financial sustainability because the financial sustainability of Estonian municipalities relies on heavily on central governments grants.

Andrews (2013) stated that the amalgamation in England and Wales appears to have weakened the financial sustainability of the amalgamated counties. Slack and Bird (2013) found that the amalgamation does not achieve any visible cost savings in Canada. Drew et al. (2014) examined the existence of a U-shaped relationship between population size and per capita expenditure in Australian local governments, and found that amalgamations increased the proportion of residents operating with diseconomies of scale.

This paper is going to add one finding from an experience in Japan to the above studies. This paper shows that financial indexes of amalgamated municipalities are worse than that those of non-amalgamated municipalities. This paper compares the financial soundness between the amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities comprehensively using some indices as measures of financial soundness.

This paper consists of the following sections. Section 2 provides brief information about the system and facts of municipal finance in Japan and the promotion policy of “Municipal Merger in Heisei Era”. Section 3 examines differences in financial soundness between the amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities. We use six indices: real balance ratio, ordinary balance ratio, debt expenditure burden ratio, real debt ratio, financial capability index, and future burden ratio. Using these six indices, we can discuss the effects of amalgamations on financial situations from various aspects, including administrative flexibility at present and in the future. Section 4 discusses our findings and section 5 gives conclusions.

2. The system and fact of financial circumstances of municipalities in Japan

Japanese local governments are divided into two levels: prefectures and

municipalities. Municipalities provide services close to residents' daily life, such as primary education, sewerage system, water supply, child care service, and so on. Table 1 shows municipal expenses by function aggregated at the national level from 1999 to 2010.

Table 1 Municipal Expenditures by function in Japan (1999 to 2010)


| | Public Welfare Expenses | | Education Expenses | | Debt Expenditure | | Civil Engineering Work Expenses | | General Administration Expenses | | Commerce and Industry Expenses | | Sanitation Expenses | | Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Expenses | | Other Expenses | | Total | |
|------|-------------------------|--------|--------------------|--------|------------------|--------|---------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------|-------|---------------------|--------|--|-------|----------------|-------|---------|---------|
| 1999 | 12376.8 | (22.9) | 6084.0 | (11.3) | 6273.5 | (11.6) | 10114.7 | (18.7) | 6650.7 | (12.3) | 2207.0 | (4.1) | 4886.7 | (9.0) | 2367.7 | (4.4) | 3057.0 | (5.7) | 54018.1 | (100.0) |
| 2000 | 10454.7 | (20.4) | 6073.7 | (11.9) | 6272.4 | (12.3) | 9686.6 | (18.9) | 6504.6 | (12.7) | 1958.7 | (3.8) | 5039.7 | (9.9) | 2222.3 | (4.3) | 2948.3 | (5.8) | 51161.0 | (100.0) |
| 2001 | 10908.2 | (21.2) | 6044.8 | (11.8) | 6456.0 | (12.6) | 9317.2 | (18.1) | 6553.1 | (12.7) | 1910.0 | (3.7) | 5222.4 | (10.2) | 2105.7 | (4.1) | 2888.5 | (5.6) | 51405.9 | (100.0) |
| 2002 | 11267.8 | (22.3) | 5902.5 | (11.7) | 6557.6 | (13.0) | 8866.0 | (17.6) | 6264.2 | (12.4) | 1798.8 | (3.6) | 5031.0 | (10.0) | 1958.0 | (3.9) | 2780.1 | (5.5) | 50426.0 | (100.0) |
| 2003 | 11930.6 | (24.0) | 5634.4 | (11.3) | 6601.7 | (13.3) | 8438.2 | (16.9) | 6436.1 | (12.9) | 1707.0 | (3.4) | 4506.7 | (9.1) | 1817.6 | (3.7) | 2712.3 | (5.4) | 49784.6 | (100.0) |
| 2004 | 12474.9 | (25.3) | 5469.3 | (11.1) | 6538.6 | (13.3) | 7859.9 | (16.0) | 6359.5 | (12.9) | 1685.8 | (3.4) | 4428.1 | (9.0) | 1618.9 | (3.3) | 2822.7 | (5.7) | 49257.8 | (100.0) |
| 2005 | 12813.5 | (26.1) | 5306.7 | (10.8) | 6805.0 | (13.9) | 7491.9 | (15.3) | 6377.1 | (13.0) | 1612.2 | (3.3) | 4355.2 | (8.9) | 1485.1 | (3.0) | 2814.0 | (5.7) | 49060.7 | (100.0) |
| 2006 | 13014.4 | (27.1) | 5213.2 | (10.9) | 6469.3 | (13.5) | 7213.1 | (15.0) | 6133.3 | (12.8) | 1626.9 | (3.4) | 4230.3 | (8.8) | 1382.4 | (2.9) | 2663.5 | (5.6) | 47946.5 | (100.0) |
| 2007 | 13544.9 | (28.1) | 5167.5 | (10.7) | 6498.9 | (13.5) | 7059.1 | (14.6) | 6263.3 | (13.0) | 1633.6 | (3.4) | 4171.1 | (8.6) | 1298.7 | (2.7) | 2586.1 | (5.4) | 48223.3 | (100.0) |
| 2008 | 13934.7 | (28.8) | 5155.7 | (10.7) | 6489.7 | (13.4) | 6819.6 | (14.1) | 6387.2 | (13.2) | 1725.6 | (3.6) | 4104.2 | (8.5) | 1237.1 | (2.6) | 2534.6 | (5.2) | 48388.4 | (100.0) |
| 2009 | 14839.1 | (28.5) | 5563.4 | (10.7) | 6348.4 | (12.2) | 6886.3 | (13.2) | 7927.1 | (15.2) | 2333.5 | (4.5) | 4244.8 | (8.2) | 1312.1 | (2.5) | 2563.7 | (4.9) | 52018.4 | (100.0) |
| 2010 | 17002.7 | (32.6) | 5591.3 | (10.7) | 6241.1 | (12.0) | 6427.3 | (12.3) | 6753.6 | (13.0) | 2048.1 | (3.9) | 4266.7 | (8.2) | 1241.4 | (2.4) | 2552.0 | (4.9) | 52124.1 | (100.0) |

Note: billion yen (%)

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2010a)


Figure 1 shows changes in the number of municipalities from 1999 to 2013. We can see that the number of municipalities sharply decreased during this period. In particular, the decreasing during the period from 2003 to 2005 was outstanding. Figure 2 shows the number of municipalities related to amalgamations. We can see that during the period from 1999 to 2010, about two-thirds of municipalities amalgamated and reduced to one-thirds.

Figure 1 Change in the Number of Municipalities



Source: http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000283315.xls

Figure 2 Results of Municipal Merger in Heisei Era



Source: http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000178773.xls

Such a large reduction of the number of municipalities was a result of the amalgamation policy of the national government, which was named “Municipal Merger of Heisei Era” after the Japanese name of era. The purpose of the amalgamation policy is to adapt changes in surroundings² of municipal service provision and strengthen fiscal foundations in municipalities by achieving scale economies.

Table 2 summarizes a brief outline of the amalgamation policy. The most important mechanism to promote amalgamations is a financial incentive which is delivered from the national government to the amalgamated municipalities. The reason why the number of amalgamation was outstanding from 2003 to 2005 is this financial incentive, which means a special treatment on general subsidy from the national government to amalgamated municipalities.

The results of amalgamations are as follows. During the first period of the amalgamation policy, the number of reduced municipalities is 1,410, the number of newly created municipalities from amalgamations is 581, and the number of amalgamated municipalities is 1,991. During the second period of the amalgamation policy, the number of reduced municipalities is 92, the number of newly created municipalities is 59, and the number of amalgamated municipalities is 151. As a whole, the number of municipalities reduced from 3,232 to 1,727 during the policy period.

3. Data and Method

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not there is a difference

² Surroundings considered by Japanese government are promotion of decentralization, policy for aging, policy for diversifying, policy for expansion of residential area, and streaming of municipal administration.

between the fiscal soundness in amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities. In order to achieve this purpose, this paper uses a statistical t-test (Student t-test in small samples).

Table 3 Explanation of Financial Index

| Financial Index | Details |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Real Balance Ratio | The ratio of real balance to standard financial scale |
| Ordinary Balance Ratio | The ratio of ordinary expenditure to ordinary revenue. |
| Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | The ratio of redemption to general resources |
| Financial Capability Index | The ratio of standard own revenue to standard expenditure |
| Real Debt Expenditure Ratio | The ratio of real redemption to standard financial scale. |
| Future Burden Ratio | The ratio of redemption over the future to standard financial scale. |

This paper employs six financial indexes as measures of fiscal soundness: real balance ratio, ordinary balance ratio, debt expenditure burden ratio, financial capability index, real debt expenditure ratio, and future burden ratio. All these measures are often used to evaluate fiscal soundness by municipalities in Japan. The meanings of these indexes are shown in Table 2. “Real balance ratio” is the ratio of net revenue to standard financial scale, and hence the larger, the better. “Ordinary balance ratio” means flexibility in financial structure, and hence the smaller, the better. “Debt expenditure burden ratio” is the ratio of redemption to general resources, and hence the lower, the better. “Financial capability index” is the average ratio of standard own revenue to standard expenditure among three years, and hence the larger, the better. “Real debt ratio” is the ratio of real redemption to standard financial scale, and hence the lower, the better. “Future burden ratio” means the ratio of redemption over the future to standard

financial scale, and hence the lower, the better.

In testing differences between the amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities, municipalities are classified into five groups according to population size; large city (over 500,000 population), middle city (over 300,000 population), small city (over 200,000 population), city (under 200,000 population), and town & village.

This paper uses financial data in 2010. Data source is “FY2010 Settlement by Municipalities” issued by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and Table 4 summarizes descriptive statistics of variables.

Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of Variables

| Large city | Real Balance Ratio | | Ordinary Balance Ratio | | Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | | Financial Capacity Index | | Real Debt Payment Ratio | | Future Burden Ratio | |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated |
| Observations | 10 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 9 |
| Sum | 5.7 | 22.2 | 965.3 | 827.1 | 217.9 | 154.5 | 8.87 | 7.67 | 137.1 | 96.1 | 1905.1 | 1026.2 |
| Mean | 0.5700 | 2.4667 | 96.5300 | 91.9000 | 21.7900 | 17.1667 | 0.8870 | 0.8522 | 13.7100 | 10.6778 | 190.5100 | 114.0222 |
| Std.Dev. | 0.4001 | 2.0543 | 1.9940 | 4.4667 | 2.7256 | 2.7362 | 0.1366 | 0.1091 | 3.4729 | 4.1268 | 51.1603 | 74.8204 |
| Variance | 0.1601 | 4.2200 | 3.9761 | 19.9511 | 7.4289 | 7.4867 | 0.0187 | 0.0119 | 12.0609 | 17.0306 | 2617.3749 | 5598.0995 |
| Range | 1.2 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 12.1 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 0.38 | 0.34 | 11.2 | 11.6 | 170.2 | 221.2 |
| Minimum | 0 | 0.2 | 93.1 | 86.1 | 17.9 | 12.8 | 0.69 | 0.69 | 10.2 | 4.3 | 115.1 | 30.1 |
| Maximum | 1.2 | 6.1 | 99.4 | 98.2 | 25.8 | 21.6 | 1.07 | 1.03 | 21.4 | 15.9 | 285.3 | 251.3 |
| Median | 0.5 | 2 | 96.6 | 90.2 | 21.6 | 17.5 | 0.9 | 0.83 | 12 | 12.2 | 194.35 | 108.9 |
| Kurtosis | -0.8901 | -0.7240 | -0.7984 | -2.0832 | -1.3669 | -1.1380 | -1.6256 | -0.8760 | 0.7388 | -1.4652 | -0.5840 | -0.1618 |
| Skewness | 0.3616 | 0.8206 | -0.1123 | 0.2096 | 0.3006 | -0.0206 | -0.2527 | 0.3908 | 1.2886 | -0.4114 | 0.1432 | 1.0270 |
| Std. Error | 0.1265 | 0.6848 | 0.6306 | 1.4889 | 0.8619 | 0.9121 | 0.0432 | 0.0364 | 1.0982 | 1.3756 | 16.1783 | 24.9401 |
| C. V. | 0.7020 | 0.8328 | 0.0207 | 0.0486 | 0.1251 | 0.1594 | 0.1540 | 0.1280 | 0.2533 | 0.3865 | 0.2685 | 0.6562 |

| Middle city | Real Balance Ratio | | Ordinary Balance Ratio | | Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | | Financial Capacity Index | | Real Debt Payment Ratio | | Future Burden Ratio | |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated |
| Observations | 13 | 27 | 13 | 27 | 13 | 27 | 13 | 27 | 13 | 27 | 11 | 25 |
| Sum | 43 | 92.9 | 1182.4 | 2399.4 | 210.7 | 459.6 | 10.75 | 21.14 | 108.1 | 279.2 | 1063.2 | 2525.2 |
| Mean | 3.3077 | 3.4407 | 90.9538 | 88.8667 | 16.2077 | 17.0222 | 0.8269 | 0.7830 | 8.3154 | 10.3407 | 96.6545 | 101.0080 |
| Std.Dev. | 1.8470 | 2.0755 | 4.1663 | 3.8890 | 4.1799 | 4.2096 | 0.1364 | 0.2157 | 3.5944 | 3.8627 | 42.1718 | 52.8841 |
| Variance | 3.4115 | 4.3076 | 17.3579 | 15.1244 | 17.4715 | 17.7210 | 0.0186 | 0.0465 | 12.9198 | 14.9202 | 1778.4625 | 2796.7239 |
| Range | 6.6 | 9.8 | 12.3 | 15.1 | 14.5 | 22.7 | 0.52 | 1.11 | 12 | 19.2 | 154.4 | 201.9 |
| Minimum | 0 | 0.1 | 84 | 80.7 | 8.7 | 7.9 | 0.5 | 0.47 | 0.4 | 0 | 28.6 | 21.8 |
| Maximum | 6.6 | 9.9 | 96.3 | 95.8 | 23.2 | 30.6 | 1.02 | 1.58 | 12.4 | 19.2 | 183 | 223.7 |
| Median | 3.6 | 2.9 | 91.8 | 88.4 | 16.3 | 16.7 | 0.81 | 0.78 | 9 | 11.3 | 89.2 | 96.9 |
| Kurtosis | -0.5638 | 1.8153 | -1.3810 | -0.4981 | -0.8090 | 3.2435 | 1.2756 | 5.7134 | 0.7545 | 1.3643 | 0.3508 | 0.2474 |
| Skewness | -0.1991 | 0.9445 | -0.2509 | -0.0859 | -0.0935 | 0.7111 | -0.6817 | 1.8450 | -1.2211 | -0.6943 | 0.6983 | 0.6086 |
| Std. Error | 0.5123 | 0.3994 | 1.1555 | 0.7484 | 1.1593 | 0.8101 | 0.0378 | 0.0415 | 0.9969 | 0.7434 | 12.7153 | 10.5768 |
| C. V. | 0.5584 | 0.6032 | 0.0458 | 0.0438 | 0.2579 | 0.2473 | 0.1650 | 0.2754 | 0.4323 | 0.3735 | 0.4363 | 0.5236 |

| Small city | Real Balance Ratio | | Ordinary Balance Ratio | | Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | | Financial Capacity Index | | Real Debt Payment Ratio | | Future Burden Ratio | |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated |
| Observations | 20 | 21 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 21 | 17 | 21 |
| Sum | 72.2 | 103.4 | 1827.5 | 1821.7 | 277 | 322 | 18.76 | 17.41 | 139.2 | 241.6 | 1187.9 | 1968.2 |
| Mean | 3.6100 | 4.9238 | 91.3750 | 86.7476 | 13.8500 | 15.3333 | 0.9380 | 0.8290 | 6.9600 | 11.5048 | 69.8765 | 93.7238 |
| Std.Dev. | 2.4787 | 2.8127 | 5.1616 | 4.1269 | 3.2867 | 2.2852 | 0.1564 | 0.1767 | 3.8367 | 3.1310 | 35.6111 | 34.9049 |
| Variance | 6.1439 | 7.9113 | 26.6419 | 17.0311 | 10.8025 | 5.2222 | 0.0245 | 0.0312 | 14.7204 | 9.8033 | 1268.1500 | 1218.3523 |
| Range | 7.6 | 11.8 | 21.1 | 17.3 | 10.9 | 7.7 | 0.71 | 0.57 | 13.6 | 10.5 | 128.7 | 125.6 |
| Minimum | 0.3 | 1.4 | 76.4 | 78.6 | 9.2 | 12 | 0.6 | 0.52 | 0.3 | 6.2 | 13.5 | 31.4 |
| Maximum | 7.9 | 13.2 | 97.5 | 95.9 | 20.1 | 19.7 | 1.31 | 1.09 | 13.9 | 16.7 | 142.2 | 157 |
| Median | 3.2 | 4.6 | 92.75 | 87.8 | 14.05 | 15.8 | 0.955 | 0.86 | 7.7 | 11.5 | 69.5 | 86.6 |
| Kurtosis | -1.3354 | 2.7247 | 2.0965 | -0.1262 | -0.9138 | -0.8552 | 0.6807 | -1.0858 | -0.8084 | -1.0880 | -0.5358 | -0.5143 |
| Skewness | 0.3947 | 1.4472 | -1.3867 | -0.0502 | 0.4142 | 0.2750 | -0.0673 | -0.2029 | -0.2680 | 0.2530 | 0.1054 | 0.0940 |
| Std. Error | 0.5543 | 0.6138 | 1.1542 | 0.9006 | 0.7349 | 0.4987 | 0.0350 | 0.0386 | 0.8579 | 0.6832 | 8.6370 | 7.6169 |
| C. V. | 0.6866 | 0.5712 | 0.0565 | 0.0476 | 0.2373 | 0.1490 | 0.1667 | 0.2131 | 0.5513 | 0.2722 | 0.5096 | 0.3724 |

| City | Real Balance Ratio | | Ordinary Balance Ratio | | Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | | Financial Capacity Index | | Real Debt Payment Ratio | | Future Burden Ratio | |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated |
| Observations | 316 | 370 | 316 | 370 | 316 | 370 | 316 | 370 | 316 | 370 | 276 | 357 |
| Sum | 1503.5 | 2103.4 | 28404.2 | 31923.5 | 4626.5 | 6292.3 | 234.33 | 205.21 | 3424.4 | 4942.7 | 26384.6 | 32344.4 |
| Mean | 4.7579 | 5.6849 | 89.8867 | 86.2797 | 14.6408 | 17.0062 | 0.7416 | 0.5546 | 10.8367 | 13.3586 | 95.5964 | 90.6006 |
| Std.Dev. | 2.6539 | 2.8305 | 4.7882 | 3.9617 | 4.4157 | 4.2479 | 0.2832 | 0.2203 | 5.5073 | 3.7990 | 79.2539 | 47.3985 |
| Variance | 7.0434 | 8.0117 | 22.9268 | 15.6947 | 19.4982 | 18.0451 | 0.0802 | 0.0485 | 30.3305 | 14.4321 | 6281.1788 | 2246.6146 |
| Range | 17.1 | 17.3 | 33 | 22.6 | 27.5 | 26.4 | 1.52 | 1.35 | 43.5 | 20.3 | 922.4 | 256.3 |
| Minimum | -3.3 | 0.3 | 74.5 | 73.4 | 5.6 | 4 | 0.12 | 0.19 | -0.7 | 2.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Maximum | 13.8 | 17.6 | 107.5 | 96 | 33.1 | 30.4 | 1.64 | 1.54 | 42.8 | 22.5 | 922.5 | 256.4 |
| Median | 4.6 | 5.3 | 89.6 | 86.65 | 14.25 | 16.7 | 0.73 | 0.5 | 10.75 | 13.35 | 82.95 | 85.8 |
| Kurtosis | 0.8212 | 1.1027 | 0.5217 | 0.1883 | 1.5826 | 0.4535 | 0.0035 | 1.5972 | 2.5633 | 0.1657 | 42.3713 | 0.0684 |
| Skewness | 0.3924 | 0.8622 | 0.0712 | -0.3095 | 0.8628 | 0.4279 | 0.3527 | 1.0663 | 0.6814 | -0.2451 | 4.5675 | 0.4848 |
| Std. Error | 0.1493 | 0.1472 | 0.2694 | 0.2060 | 0.2484 | 0.2208 | 0.0159 | 0.0115 | 0.3098 | 0.1975 | 4.7705 | 2.5086 |
| C. V. | 0.5578 | 0.4979 | 0.0533 | 0.0459 | 0.3016 | 0.2498 | 0.3819 | 0.3972 | 0.5082 | 0.2844 | 0.8290 | 0.5232 |

| Town and Village | Real Balance Ratio | | Ordinary Balance Ratio | | Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | | Financial Capacity Index | | Real Debt Payment Ratio | | Future Burden Ratio | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated |
| Observations | 785 | 156 | 785 | 156 | 785 | 156 | 785 | 156 | 781 | 156 | 562 | 133 |
| Sum | 5317.8 | 931.1 | 64428.9 | 13018.7 | 11638.1 | 3003.1 | 340.47 | 48.91 | 9632.3 | 2296.7 | 41257.8 | 11871.7 |
| Mean | 6.7743 | 5.9686 | 82.0750 | 83.4532 | 14.8256 | 19.2506 | 0.4337 | 0.3135 | 12.3333 | 14.7224 | 73.4125 | 89.2609 |
| Std.Dev. | 4.7609 | 3.7567 | 6.8064 | 4.4034 | 5.3254 | 5.2587 | 0.3195 | 0.1363 | 4.4010 | 3.6724 | 49.1692 | 45.3685 |
| Variance | 22.6659 | 14.1125 | 46.3275 | 19.3897 | 28.3599 | 27.6544 | 0.1021 | 0.0186 | 19.3690 | 13.4864 | 2417.6065 | 2058.3006 |
| Range | 44.6 | 18.7 | 64.6 | 27.9 | 34.7 | 28.4 | 2.5 | 0.92 | 29.3 | 23.6 | 323 | 214 |
| Minimum | -9.6 | 0.6 | 38.9 | 65.4 | 0.1 | 5.6 | 0.05 | 0.12 | -3.1 | 1.9 | 0.1 | 3.8 |
| Maximum | 35 | 19.3 | 103.5 | 93.3 | 34.8 | 34 | 2.55 | 1.04 | 26.2 | 25.5 | 323.1 | 217.8 |
| Median | 5.8 | 4.8 | 82.2 | 84 | 14.4 | 19.1 | 0.34 | 0.28 | 12.5 | 14.95 | 66.85 | 82.8 |
| Kurtosis | 6.0211 | 0.9352 | 2.2288 | 1.0240 | 0.6925 | 0.3067 | 3.7708 | 6.8696 | 0.4167 | 1.3782 | 2.0157 | -0.2079 |
| Skewness | 1.8109 | 1.1001 | -0.5010 | -0.6108 | 0.4275 | 0.3447 | 1.6331 | 2.0707 | -0.0977 | -0.4494 | 1.0844 | 0.4489 |
| Std. Error | 0.1699 | 0.3008 | 0.2429 | 0.3526 | 0.1901 | 0.4210 | 0.0114 | 0.0109 | 0.1575 | 0.2940 | 2.0741 | 3.9339 |
| C. V. | 0.7028 | 0.6294 | 0.0829 | 0.0528 | 0.3592 | 0.2732 | 0.7367 | 0.4347 | 0.3568 | 0.2494 | 0.6698 | 0.5083 |

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2012)

4. Result and Discussion

Table 5 shows tested results. In sum, tested results appears to be considered as follows; amalgamations have effective impacts on financial improvement of large cities,

there are not significant difference between the amalgamated middle cities and non-amalgamated middle cities, amalgamations have negative impacts of financial improvement of small cities, cities, and town and villages.

Table 5 Tested Results: Large City

| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Difference | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|-----|
| Sample | 10 | 9 | | |
| Real Balance Ratio | 0.570 | 2.467 | 1.897 | ** |
| | (0.422) | (2.179) | (1.757) | |
| Ordinary Balance Ratio | 96.530 | 91.900 | 4.630 | ** |
| | (2.102) | (4.738) | (2.636) | |
| Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | 21.790 | 17.167 | 4.623 | *** |
| | (2.873) | (2.902) | (0.029) | |
| Financial Capability Index | 0.887 | 0.852 | 0.035 | |
| | (0.144) | (0.116) | (0.028) | |
| Real Debt Payment Ratio | 13.710 | 10.678 | 3.032 | |
| | (3.661) | (4.377) | (0.716) | |
| Future Burden Ratio | 190.510 | 114.022 | 76.488 | ** |
| | (53.928) | (79.359) | (25.431) | |

Middle City

| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Difference | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|--|
| Sample | 13 | 27 | | |
| Real Balance Ratio | 3.308 | 3.441 | 0.133 | |
| | (1.922) | (2.115) | (0.193) | |
| Ordinary Balance Ratio | 90.954 | 88.867 | 2.087 | |
| | (4.336) | (3.963) | (0.373) | |
| Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | 16.208 | 17.022 | 0.815 | |
| | (4.351) | (4.290) | (0.061) | |
| Financial Capability Index | 0.827 | 0.783 | 0.044 | |
| | (0.142) | (0.220) | (0.078) | |
| Real Debt Payment Ratio | 8.315 | 10.341 | 2.025 | |
| | (3.741) | (3.936) | (0.195) | |
| Future Burden Ratio | 96.655 | 101.008 | 4.353 | |
| | (44.230) | (53.975) | (9.744) | |

Small City

| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Difference | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----|
| Sample | 20 | 21 | | |
| Real Balance Ratio | 3.610 (2.543) | 4.924 (2.882) | 1.314 (0.339) | |
| Ordinary Balance Ratio | 91.375 (5.296) | 86.748 (4.229) | 4.627 (1.067) | *** |
| Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | 13.850 (3.372) | 15.333 (2.342) | 1.483 (1.030) | |
| Financial Capability Index | 0.938 (0.160) | 0.829 (0.181) | 0.109 (0.021) | ** |
| Real Debt Payment Ratio | 6.960 (3.936) | 11.505 (3.208) | 4.545 (0.728) | *** |
| Future Burden Ratio | 69.876 (36.707) | 93.724 (35.767) | 23.847 (0.940) | * |

City

| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Difference | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----|
| Sample | 316 | 370 | | |
| Real Balance Ratio | 4.758 (2.658) | 5.685 (2.834) | 0.927 (0.176) | *** |
| Ordinary Balance Ratio | 89.887 (4.796) | 86.280 (3.967) | 3.607 (0.829) | *** |
| Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | 14.641 (4.423) | 17.006 (4.254) | 2.365 (0.169) | *** |
| Financial Capability Index | 0.742 (0.284) | 0.555 (0.221) | 0.187 (0.063) | *** |
| Real Debt Payment Ratio | 10.837 (5.516) | 13.359 (3.804) | 2.522 (1.712) | *** |
| Future Burden Ratio | 95.596 (79.398) | 90.601 (47.465) | 4.996 (31.933) | |

Town and Village

| | Non-Amalgamated | Amalgamated | Difference | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----|
| Sample | 785 | 156 | | |
| Real Balance Ratio | 6.774 (4.764) | 5.969 (3.769) | 0.806 (0.995) | ** |
| Ordinary Balance Ratio | 82.075 (6.811) | 83.453 (4.418) | 1.378 (2.393) | *** |
| Debt Expenditure Burden Ratio | 14.826 (5.329) | 19.251 (5.276) | 4.425 (0.053) | *** |
| Financial Capability Index | 0.434 (0.320) | 0.314 (0.137) | 0.120 (0.183) | *** |
| Real Debt Payment Ratio | 12.333 (4.404) | 14.722 (3.684) | 2.389 (0.720) | *** |
| Future Burden Ratio | 73.412 (49.213) | 89.261 (45.540) | 15.848 (3.673) | *** |

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** presents a significant level at $p < 0.01$, **

presents a significant level at $p < 0.05$, and * presents a significant level at $p < 0.1$.

The tested results of middle city may be impressive, because there are not significant differences for all financial indexes between the amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities. From these results, we can consider that the amalgamation policy does not have impact on financial improvements of middle cities.

As a whole, we can consider that a population size has a relationship with financial impacts of amalgamations. The results suggest that municipalities with large population achieve financial improvement through amalgamations, and municipalities with small population cannot achieve financial improvement through amalgamations.

Second suggestion is that only the municipalities whose fiscal soundness is weak amalgamated. However, in order to confirm this suggestion, we should test financial situation before the amalgamation policy.

Last, a service provision of municipalities may not have scale-economy. Municipalities provide services closely to daily life of residents. These services seem to have small scale economies, relative to services provided by the central and prefectural governments.

5. Conclusion

This paper studies a fiscal impact of this amalgamation policy on a fiscal soundness of municipalities. In order to achieve this purpose, this paper tests whether there are statistical differences in fiscal soundness between the amalgamated municipalities and non-amalgamated municipalities, using municipal's fiscal data.

Our results show that a fiscal soundness of non-amalgamated municipalities is

statistically better than that of amalgamated municipalities. This result has the following three suggestions. First, although succeeding in the reduction of the number of municipalities, the amalgamation policy did not achieve an improvement of fiscal soundness of municipalities. Second suggestion is that only the municipalities whose fiscal soundness is weak amalgamated. Last, a service provision of municipalities does not have scale-economy.

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Table 2 Brief summary of the policy of “Municipal Merger in Heisei Era”

| | First Period: FY1999-FY2005 | Second Period: FY2006-FY2010 |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| Object | To realize 1,000 municipalities after amalgamations | |
| Method | Financial Incentive: special treatment on general subsidy from national government to amalgamated municipalities for 15 years, special treatment on municipal debts to finance the expenses due to amalgamation (compensations for principals and interests) | Financial Incentive: special treatment on general subsidy from national government to amalgamated municipalities for 10 years, |
| Changes in municipalities | Amalgamated municipalities: 1,991 Newly created municipalities from amalgamations: 581 Reduced municipalities by amalgamations: 1,410 | Amalgamated municipalities: 151 Newly created municipalities from amalgamations: 59 Reduced municipalities by amalgamations: 92 |
| Average population per municipalities | 36,387 people in 1,999 to 68,947 people in 2010 | |
| Average squares per municipalities | 114.8 square km in 1999 to 215.0 square km in 2010 | |